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1. It is necessary at the outset to clarify the purpose of this 
paper and confine its application to particular events and circumstances 
that occurred during the years 1960-66. Those years, commencing roughly 
with the anti-pass law campaign in March 1960 (~harpeville), mark the 
emergence of a new phase in the African political struggle, characterized 
by disillusionment and frustration at the previous methods of reformism 
and non-violent protest waged by all movements, and the transition to a 
course of militancy and planned violence, resulting in a series of 
dramatic events and an arsenal of repressive measures adopted by the 
South African Government. It is intended to trace briefly the sequence 
of events that occurred and the steps taken by white South Africa to 
meet the new situation. This paper purports only to present a chronicle 
of the events of those years, and leaves the questions of the reasons 
for their emergence at that particular moment in history, and their 
short term failure and eclipse by 1966, open for discussion. 
The main difficulty in assessing the period is the almost 
total absence of an objective report covering the whole period, free from 
the limitations and restrictions imposed on the commentators by their own 
participation in the sequence of events, and their commitment or partisan 
involvement in the ideology or politics of a particular stream of African 
political thought. The history is too recent and the ideological and 
emotional differences too sharply defined to make the task of assessing 
the period an easy one. The available literature falls into two mtually 
antagonistic categories, the accounts written by certain white South 
Africans, emphasising the violence and potential chaos resulting from the 
activities of the "great Communist-Liberal conspiracy", and the accounts 
written by members of the South African underground, often thinly 
disguised propaganda for their own movement, and nearly all heavily 
weighted (not necessarily accurately) in favour of the activities of the 
Congress Alliance. 
It is proposed to survey the events of the period based on 
' 
material drawn from newspapers and periodicals, reports and publications 
of the South African Institute of Race Relations as well as interviews 
with members of the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, 
Non-European Unity Movement, and various publications issued by them, 
respectively. Certain use will also be made of reports of Court 
Proceedings and Statutes passed by the South African Government. 
2. The events at Sharpeville in 1960 radically altered the 
course of South African history. ~fter years of passive resistance and 
political protest, the country was plunged into five years of sabotage 
and violence. The South African police acted efficiently and 
ruthlessly. Nearly all the underground movements were uncovered and 
savage sentences were imposed on their leaders. The Government passed 
a series of legislation conferring on the police wide-ranging powers of 
detention and methods of obtaining information and evidence. Detention 
without trial, solitary confinement for periods up to 180 days, and the 
frequent use of torture became features of the police's daily routine. 
A series of showpiece trials were effectively prepared to placate 
alarmed white society and virtually destroy the entire leadership of 
the opposition. 
In broad terms, organized opposition in South Africa by and 
large followed the pattern of racial stratification of the country. 
The Congress Alliance was compartmentalized into the African National 
Congress  l lack) , Congress of Democrats (White), Indian National 
Congress, Coloured Peoples Congress, and SACTU (the South African 
Congress of Trade unions) ; the Pan Africanist Congress drew an almost 
exclusively black membership, the Non-European Unity Movement largely 
relied on Coloured members, the Liberal Party on White. Deep rooted 
ideological differences separated the movements, but from 1960 at least 
one consistent pattern emerged. All movements rejected their history 
of passive resistance, and to a certain extent boycott and reformism; 
all embraced the necessity and inevitability of direct and violent 
confrontation with white South Africa. 
South Africa has known sporadic racial violence for a long 
time. The transition to planned violence began after the sequence of 
events climaxed by the Sharpeville shootings on March 21, 1960. It did 
not gain much momentum, however, until after the strike called for May 
31, 1961, failed to induce the Government to convoke a multiracial 
national convention to discuss a new constitution. Thus, the deliberate 
use of force as a weapon to depose the Government is still in its 
infancy in South Africa. (1) 
The Africans! turn towards violence has been reluctant and 
painful. As late as December 1961, Chief Luthuli said: "We in our 
situation have chosen the path of non-violence of our own volition. " (2) 
Witnesses at the Treason Trial insisted that violence was 
outside the policy of the Congress Alliance (but this may have been 
legal strategy). 
Nelson Mandela, after Sharpeville: "If peaceful protests like 
these are to be put down by mobilisation of the army and the police, 
then the people might be forced to use other methods of struggle." (3) 
Potlaka K. Leballo, in December 1962: "The African People 
recognise that to effect change in South Africa the present situation, 
whereby white South Africa holds the monopoly of military power, must 
be changed. This can be achieved only by our acquisition of the means 
of challenging that military power." (4) 
Patrick Duncan, directly after Sharpeville: "Africans have 
seen enough of the power of non-violence to make them sure that non- 
violence has everything that is necessary for their success in the 
future. (5) But two years later: "Through the unyielding 
oppressiveness of the apartheid government there is now no chance of a 
peaceful transition to freedom and democracy. The way to power in South 
Africa now lies through the use of force." (6) 
Events leading to the State of Emergency 
a) Tightening of the Pass Laws and consequent demonstrations. 
Wide-spread demonstrations against passes for women took 
place throughout the country from 1957 to 1959, particularly 
in Johannesburg in October 1958 and Pretoria in February 
1959. (7) In September 1957 there was rioting in the 
Zeerust area, resulting from the distribution of passes for 
women. 
b) Riots in Sekhukhuneland over the introduction of the Bantu 
Authorities. (8) 
c) Proclamation 67 of 1958 empowered the Government to declare 
the A.N.C. or any other organizations to be unlawful in 
African Reserves. (9) 
d) Wide-spread rioting throughout the country resulting from 
a number of economic and social grievances, particularly 
in Cato Manor, Durban, Johannesburg, and Paarl. (10) 
e) Emergency regulations in the Transkei (~roclamation 400 of 
1960). 
f) Bus boycott at Alexandra Township in 1957. 
g) Establishment of "Africanistn group in the A.N.C. in 1958 
dissatisfied with "multi-racial liberalism of the A.N.C., 
its domination by Communists in the Congress of Democrats 
and its lack of militancy in implementing the Program of 
Action of 194gft. (11) 
h) Establishment of the Pan-African Congress in 1959 by 
Sobukwe and Leballo, aiming at "government of the Africans 
by the Africans and rejecting the idea of a multi-racial 
society". (12) 
i) Preparation for a campaign against the pass laws on 31st 
March 1960 by the A.N.C. 
j) National campaign against the pass laws planned by the 
P.A.C. for the 21st March 1960 on the lines that members 
were to present themselves at police stations without 
their passes, invite arrest, and accept gaol sentences 
without appealing, in order to disrupt the country but 
still in a non-violent manner. (13) 
Emergency Regulations 
a) Unlawful Organisations Act No. 34 of 1960. 
On the 8th April the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. were declared 
to be unlawful organizations. 
b) On the 24th March a ban was placed on all public meetings. 
c) Between 30th March and 2nd April the entire Citizen Force 
and Commandos were mobilized as required. 
d) Proclamation 90 of 30th March declared a State of Emergency, 
banning publications and gatherings. 
e) A total of 1,907 people were detained under the Emergency 
Regulations. 
f) P.A.C. leaders were sentenced to varying terms of 
imprisonment. (14) 
5 During the period immediately after the Declaration of a 
State of Ehnergency various strikes and demonstrations were held with 
varying degrees of success, culminating in the calling of an l'All-inll 
conference in March 1961. (15) The conference was held despite the 
withdrawal of the P.A.C. (because they opposed the inclusion of 
organizations representative of other racial groups in formulating a 
positive alternative to apartheid) and the arrest and intimidation of 
some of the organizers. The Non-European Unity Movement refused to have 
any contact with "adventurist and opportunist" politics. A National 
Action Council was appointed under Nelson Mandela, which called for a 
"stay-at-homet1 demonstration which only pa~tially succeeded. The General 
Law Amendment Act of 1961 was passed, providing, inter alia, for the 
detention of people for periods of up to twelve days without bail. (16) 
It is this chain of events, together with the analysis and 
discussion between people while in detention during the emergency, which 
gave rise to the phase of organized violence which swept over South 
Africa from 1961 to 1966. "It was not the intention of Africans to 
advocate violence for the sake of violence. That would be outright 
irresponsibility. All other possible avenues had been explored. 
Unfortunately, none of the non-violent ones had been found effective. 
Force is an extension of all the possible non-violent avenues that have 
been tried and have failed; thus force is a logical sequence in the 
progression of trying to obtain certain objectives. Force and non- 
violence are interdependent. " (17) 
6. Two basic approaches may be discerned in the organized 
violence up till 1966: (i) sabotage against industrial and communications 
installations, and (ii) popular outbursts, coupled with sporadic killings 
and bombings. Two underground organizations, the National Liberation 
Committee (later African Resistance ~ovement) and Umkonto We Zizwe 
(spear of the  ati ion), functioned during that period as sabotage groups, 
and one, Poqo (alone, only, or pure in ~hosa) , fell into the second 
category. In embryonic form, a third approach, calling for preparation 
for eventual guerrilla warfare, appeared in the National Liberation 
Front (Y.C .C. club), but was never very significant. "There was no 
co-operation among these groups; they developed acrimonious disputes 
over tactics, political orientation, racial policy, and competitive 
approaches to sympathisers in independent Africa and elsewhere. l' (18) 
The five year period immediately following Sharpeville 
produced a series of rather rash and ill-prepared attempts by the 
underground organizations to effect a quick and fundamental change in 
the political structure in South Africa by the use of direct and 
violent confrontation with white society. It is as if the futility of 
all the years of protest and passive demonstrations suddenly exploded 
into a frustrated and, in the short term, vain attempt to obtain 
political liberation overnight. It is suggested that this period 
emphasizes the widespread decision amongst all political movements to 
embark upon a course of violence irrespective of their ideological 
differences, in accordance with the wave of mass opinion disillusioned 
with previous methods of struggle. It is also necessary to analyse the 
reasons for the temporary failure of their action in the light of the 
measures adopted to combat them by the South African Government. 
7 The African National Congress 
After its banning many members were in goal, some in hiding, 
and others left the country to participate in their external mission 
which had been set up by Oliver Tanbo. Those members remaining 
reorganized underground, in the light of the prevailing opinion on 
future tactics, formed a specialized militant wing, Umkonto We Sizwe, to 
undertake a phase of sabotage leading to later stages of guerrilla 
warfare. "Already there are indications in the country that Africans 
are turning to deliberate acts of violence and of force against the 
Government in order to persuade the Government in the only language 
which this Government shows by its behaviour that it understands." (19) 
M a n y  members of the A.N.C. claim that the inevitability of violence was 
foreseen long before Sharpeville and that certain preparations were 
made for overseas training of members as long before as 1957. (20) 
It appears that Umkonto and the A.N.C. were kept apart and 
operated separately, and that instructions were given to members of Umkonto 
that in carrying out sabotage operations they were not to kill or injure 
people. (21) Between December 1961 and the end of 1964 there were sporadic 
acts of sabotage throughout the country directed at Government Department 
buildings, pylons and railway lines. The' Minister of Justice said in the 
Senate that up to 10th March 1964 there had been 203 serious cases of 
sabotage (22) and 17nobody will deny that a crisis exists in South Africa. 
For the first time organized murder is being used as a political weapon1'. (23) 
It is not publicly known exactly how m a y  people were arrested 
for activities outlined above during this period. According to various 
Ministerial statements in reply to questions in Parliament, 2,169 were 
arrested in 1963. By June 1964, 1,931 had been sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment. At least 51 people had been sentenced to death and some 
15 to life imprisonment. (24) 
The Rivonia Trial: October 1963 
The State alleged 199 acts of sabotage preparatory to 
guerrilla warfare, coupled with a plan entitled Operation 
Mayibuye for a preliminary stage of sabotage to be followed 
by mass revolutionary action. The Court accepted the 
contention that Umkonto had not adopted this plan but 
sentenced the leadership to life imprisonment. (25) 
2. Trial of V. Mini, Z. Nkaba and others : March 1964 
Found guilty of ordering the murder of a witness against 
Umkonto and sentenced to death. 
3. Five major trials of members of Umkonto were held in 1964, 
33 persons were convicted, one sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and the rest to terms up to 20 years. 
4. Throughout the period innumerable trials took place in 
several centres, of Africans charged with membership of the 
banned A.N.C. Average sentences received were about 3 years. 
5. In 1966 Abram Fischer, &.C., was found guilty on various 
charges of having conspired with Umkonto to aid and procure 
the commission of and to commit acts of sabotage, and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
6. The Communist Party of South Africa participated fully in the 
programme of Umkonto during this period but there is little 
evidence of separate overt activities on their part other 
than meeting and discussion. 
It should be emphasized that throughout the period the policy 
of Umkonto was directed specifically against installations and property, 
and considerable care was taken to avoid the possibility of death or 
in jury to persons. (27) During the first five years of A.N.C . S 
transition from its old policies to direct and violent militancy, there 
was extreme reluctance on the part of its leaders to commit themselves 
fully to the inevitability of full "military" confrontation. By the end 
of 1966 it was accepted within Umkonto that the first phase of sabotage 
had ended. Owing to the efficiency of police methods, it had to a 
large extent failed. It had certainly failed to make my inroads into 
white opinion, and by 1967 the decision was taken to embark upon a 
policy of full and open violent confrontation with white South 
Africa. (28) 
The Pan-Africanist Congress 
It has always been claimed by leaders of P.A.C. that from 
their formation in 1959 they always envisaged the inevitability of direct 
violence in their struggle, and that their Disciplinary Code made 
provision for its adoption as a direct tactic. (29) Evidence of this, 
however, does not really appear till late in 1961. The methods and 
policy adopted by P.A.C. during its anti-pass law campaign in 1960 do 
not appear to be radically different from those waged by the A.N.C. 
since the Defimce Campaign. The events at Sharpeville, however, seem 
to have ended any further attempts at waging a non-violent struggle. 
"The people were impatient and thought only in terms of direct 
confrontation. They wished to seize weapons and kill whites", suggest 
some leaders now, in retrospect. (30) According to Mr. Frank Barton, 
editor of Drum and Post, giving evidence before the Snyman Commission 
in 1963, Philip Kgosana said in March 1960: llThe march (on capetown) 
had been the government~s last chance to come to terms with legitimate 
African demands. When the Government refused to negotiate, it cast the 
die for a bloodbath. 
Unlike the A.N.C., P.A.C., in the form of Poqo, rejected the 
concept of symbolic sabotage and immediately embarked upon a policy of 
terrorism and killing in a futile attempt to obtain llfreedom by 1963". 
Some doubts have been expressed as to-the direct link between P.A.C. and 
Poqo. It certainly is clearly claimed today by P.A.C. leadership tliat 
Poqo was the continuation of P.A.C. activities after the banning of the 
movement. A.N.C. members have explained the Poqo outbreak as sporadic 
and isolated violence occurring as a result of frustration and merely 
capitalized upon by P.A.C. leaders after its clear emergence. 
The evidence seems clearly to indicate that Poqo nevertheless 
was the continuation of P.A.C. activities underground. The use of the 
term Poqo had frequently been used by members of the Africanist section 
of A.N.C. prior to 1958, to separate them from "the multi-racialr1 outlook 
of other members. Most members of Poqo who gave evidence at trials 
exposing them admitted that the movement had been started by P.A.C. The 
Snyman Commission appointed to enquire into the Paarl riots of 1962 issued 
an interim report in March 1963, in which Mr. Justice Sn~rman found Poqo 
to be m arm of the banned P.A.C. "People who address Poqo gatherings 
previously addressed P.A.C. gatherings. The entrance and subscription 
fees are Yne same. The aims are the same. The division of the work is 
the same. 'l (31) The P.A.C. leadership in exile was quick to endorse 
these claims. P. K. Leballo, the acting head of P.A.C., claimed at an 
interview on March 25, 1963, in Haseru, that P.A.C. and Poqo were 
synonymous. He announced that a large scale uprising would be launched 
during 1963 and that the P.A.C. were discussing the time and manner in 
which it would be launched. He credited the outburst in Paarl as 
"impatient P.A.C. members disobeying orders to wait until instructions 
were given". He was critical of A.N.C. sabotage, claiming it was the 
result of lack of mass following. He claimed Poqots strength lay in its 
membership, which he estimated at 150,000. (32) To a certain extent, 
the Snyman Commission found evidence to support the existence of some of 
the highly exaggerated plans: a membershi? list containing 15,000 names 
was discovered in a raid by police on Leballors office in Maseru. (33) 
Activities attributed to Poqo 
1. Langa. Murder in February 1963 of three African policemen 
and a white businessman. 
2. Paarl. Two whites and eleven Africans were killed 
(five Africans were shot by the police). 
3. Transkei. Several attempts were made on the life of 
pro-Government chiefs and several African informers 
were killed. At Bashee Bridge five whites were killed. 
4. Many small uprisings took place in areas such as Capetown, 
Victoria West, Benoni, East London, Worcester, etc., most 
of which were anticipated and apprehended by the police. (34) 
According to information given by the Minister of Justice 
in June 1964, by that date 202 members of Poqo had been 
found guilty of murder and 1,724 members had been found 
guilty of lesser crimes. (35) 
During the period 1962 to 1965 hardly a day passed in the 
South African legal calendar without there being a trial involving 
members of Poqo. llPoqo was certainly the best publicized movement 
in the '60s, thanks in part to the number of people involved in its 
activities, in part to the dramatic, sometimes brutal, nature of these 
activities, and in part to the Government~s selection of Poqo as its 
chief adversary.ll (34) 
However, by 1965, again owing to successful police 
infiltration and tactics adopted as well as the crude and unplanned 
tactics of Poqo and their lack of any clear policy, by and large the 
movement was broken and P.A.C. received a critical set-back from which 
it has hardly recovered. Wide dissension has appeared in its leaderships 
abroad and there is extreme dissatisfaction with the leadership of 
Leballo. Whatever final assessment is made of it, there is no doubt that 
it provoked widespread enthusiasm amongst Africans, such as no movement 
ha& hitherto been able to promote, as well as genuine terror amongst 
white South Africans. "Nevertheless it is doubtful that these episodes 
were part of a general plan aimed toward any specific short-range goals 
and it is now clear that the organisation was neither strong nor cohesive 
enough to survive police retaliation." (37) "There can be no doubt that 
Poqo is the live embodiment of virulent black nationalism which thrives 
on the poverty, degradation, rightlessness and political immaturity of 
the black masses. Its primitive appeal to anti-white racialism finds a 
ready response in the locations and townships of South Africa. It has 
discarded non-violence as a method of struggle and elevated terrorism to 
a position of supremacy. Since its internal organisation is the most 
haphazard and undisciplined imaginable, it will be clear that the 
terrorism of Poqo while it can very well upset the ruling class, is not 
able to unseat it. And yet it is clear also that the State considers 
this Poqo to be the most- immediate danger to its security and its 
continued existence. " (~iberation, April 1963. ) 
It is interesting to note that a report appeared in Newsweek 
on April 8, 1963: l'Ghanals President, Kwame Nkrumah, is believed to 
have contributed U.S.$7O,OOO as well as weapons to the terrorist 
organisation Poqo." The validity of this appears to be doubtful. 
Non-European Unity Movement 
After the boycott of the activities after Sharpeville by the 
various bodies belonging to the Unity Movement, for a number of reasons 
not relevant to this paper, the African People's Democratic Union of 
Southern Africa (APDUSA) was formed in 1961, under the leadership inter 
alia of I. M. Tabata. The policies and tactics appeared to be little 
more than a continuation of Unity programmes over previous years, with 
strong emphasis placed on economic analysis and membership small and 
confined to Coloured people in the Cape and some African support in the 
Transkei. It is not necessary to outline the development of their 
policy, save in so far as it gave rise to a break-away group in 1962 
falling into line with the pattern of development of the other 
movements. It should be mentioned here that it is now alleged by APDUSA 
that their policy always envisaged the adoption of violent revolutionary 
tactics (38), but that until 1971 little evidence has appeared to support 
this. In 1962 a section of APDUSA under Dr. N. Alexander and Dr. K. 
Abrahams broke away in the Cape to form the Y.C.C. club, later known as 
the National Liberation Front. Reasons given at the time were 
dissatisfaction with the sterile leadership of APDUSA and lack of a 
clear plan to introduce preparations for the commencement of armed 
struggle in accordance with the trends shown by other movements. 
"Revolution does not exclude the possibility of peaceful change. However, 
this depends on the attitude of the Government in power. Events had 
taken a revolutionary turn. I realized that the masses would soon lose 
faith in passive methods. What worries me most of all was the fact that 
the traditional leadership of the whole non-white movement had firmly 
believed in non-violent methods of struggle." (39) 
The movement studied ways of securing a united front and 
investigated literature on guerrilla warfare, considering it necessary 
to have a knowledge of this in case armed conflict should occur between 
the Government and the masses. Various attempts were made to form cells 
in country areas, but very little was achieved before virtually all the 
members were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging 
between five and ten years. Meetings had been held and a large quantity 
of revolutionary literature produced, but activities never proceeded far 
beyond what would only be described as a discussion group. 
10. African Resistance Movement 
Shortly after the detention of members of various organizations 
following the Emergency Regulations post Sharpeville, a National Committee 
for Liberation was formed, consisting mainly of white former members of 
the Liberal Party, the Congress of Democrats, and various persons not 
known to have previously been involved in politics. The activities were 
confined to sabotage, largely along the same lines as Umkonto, but no 
attempts were made to co-ordinate activities. The organization which 
later became the A.R.M. saw itself largely as expressing sympathy and 
solidarity with African Movements as well as a Sadly defined 
attempt to shock white South Africa into a state of partial economic 
chaos and collapse to impress upon them the seriousness of the changing 
pattern of events in the country. The general response of the white 
community was entirely to reject their activity. To a certain extent they 
gained some respect from Africans by their gesture and personal 
involvement in similar methods of struggle. "Herein lay the bitterest 
irony: at the moment when the Liberals had at last won the sympathy and 
trust of large numbers of non-whites, they had almost totally alienated 
themselves from the white community." (J. Robertson: Liberalism in 
South Africa 1948-196 - 3)
Six major A.R.M. trials were held in 1964, which disclosed 
that the conspiracy had been a small one, not seeking mass support. It 
appeared that several acts of sabotage had taken place, mainly in 
Capetown and Johannesburg, and twelve A.R.M. members were sentenced to 
periods of imprisonment ranging from four to fifteen years. One member, 
John Harris, was hanged after planting a bomb in the Johannesburg 
railway station. The Movement appeared to have enjoyed little support 
and had little impact on white South Africans. 
11. Various other attempts at sabotage not directly connected 
with any specific organizations took place during this period, 
representing to a large extent the mood of the period and largely the 
frustration experienced over all the long years of passive resistance. 
12. Measures introduced by the Government to deal with the situation 
It is suggested that the legal measures passed by the South 
African Parliament during this period,together with the abundance of 
informers and pressures brought to bear on some members, empowered the 
police effectively to curb and largely end the period of open violent 
confrontation. 
1. General Law Amendment Act of 1962 
This created the offence of sabotage, widely defined, and 
empowered the Government to issue special proclamations 
when the need arose, to ban organizations, meetings, 
periodicals and persons. It laid down penalties varying 
from a minimum of five years to the death penalty, and 
also introduced the system of house arrest. 
2. General Law Amendment Act of 1963 
Following directly on the Snyman Commission Report 
relating to the activities of Poqo, the main provisions 
were : 
a) Any organization which had been in existence since 
April 1960 would be declared unlawful. 
b) Poqo was equated with P.A.C. 
c) Persons convicted of certain offences of a political 
nature could be held in detention after completion of 
their prison sentences, for periods of twelve months 
at a time (the Sobukwe clause). 
d) Detention for interrogation for periods up to ninety 
days without warrant (renewable) of anyone suspected 
of having information about political offences. The 
terms of detention were in solitary confinement. 
e) Preparatory examinations in trials of a political 
nature were dispensed with. 
f) Bail may be refused without any reasons. 
g) Any act furthering the aims of communism or an unlawful 
organization became an offence retrospective to 1950. 
3 .  General Law Amendment Act of 1964 
After the reluctance of many witnesses, particularly in the 
trial of Dr. Alexander, to give evidence, it became an offence 
to refuse to give evidence, punishable by imprisonment for a 
period of twelve months at a time. 
The Congress of Democrats was banned, Umkonto equated with 
the A.N.C. and thus banned, and a large number of private individuals 
were placed under house arrest or banned from attending any gatherings. 
By the end of 1964, 48 people had been placed under house 
arrest and 352 received banning orders. 
4. The General Law Amendment of 1965 substituted 180 days for 
the 90 days clause. 
The evidence to obtain convictions against members of 
underground organizations was largely obtained under these provisions. 
According to the Minister of Justice, by 29th January 1965 
altogether 1,095 persons had been detained under the 90 days clause; of 
these 575 had been charged with offences, of whom 272 were convicted and 
241 gavs evidence for the State in criminal trials. (41) 
13. The above represents a very brief survey of the events that 
took place between 1960 and 1966, by which time by and large the outbreaks 
of sabotage and violence were brought to an end. There have since then 
been sporadic attempts at both methods from time to time, but nothing on 
the scale represented by those years. An entire section of the leadership 
of the African movements are now either abroad or in various gaols 
throughout the country. All movements have since gone through various 
phases of regrouping and reorganizing internally and externally, both 
their membership and their tactics, for the next period of political 
struggle. It remains to consider in discussion the significance of this 
period in the development of African politics and the reasons for its 
emergence and effective suppression by the South African Government. On 
the one hand, there weRthe efficient and successful measures adopted by 
the police at the time, on the other hand, the movements can be considered 
to be largely self-destructive, as evidenced by the lack of preparation 
undertaken by each, the underestimating of the ability and determination 
of the police, and the comparative ease with which the police were able 
to ascertain the presence of the leadership and effectively curb their 
activities. (42) 
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